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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the properties of iterative non-injective functions and the
security of primitives where they are used. First, we introduce the Collision Probability Spectrum
(cps) parameter to quantify how far from a permutation a function is. In particular, we show that
the output size decreases linearly with the number of iterations whereas the collision trees grow
quadratically.
Secondly, we investigate the t-sponge construction and show how certain cps and rate values lead
to an improved preimage attack on long messages. As an example, we ﬁnd collisions for the gluon-
64 internal function, approximate its cps, and show an attack that violates the security claims. For
instance, if a message ends with a sequence of 1 Mb (respectively 1 Gb) of zeros, then our preimage
search takes time 2115.3 (respectively 2105.3) instead of 2128.
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1 Introduction
Consider a function g : S → S where S is some ﬁnite space of size 2N and suppose that it is not
a permutation, i.e. that it has collisions. It is well known that for a random g the complexity of
a collision search is of 2N/2 calls to g. However, not only the collision search complexity but also
some related problems are not well studied when collisions have a certain structure, which is the
case in several designs [BD08,Gol97]. It might be clear that iterating such a function may lead
to an entropy loss, but again, the scale of this loss and its implications on the security of stream
ciphers and hash functions is not well known or underestimated. In this paper we introduce
a particular parameter called the Collision Probability Spectrum (cps), which is based on the
number of solutions for the following equation
g(a+ y) = g(a). (1)
We study the cps for several designs and show, as an illustration of our methodology, a preimage
attack on the sponge-based lightweight hash function gluon-64.
Related work. Bellare and Kohno [BK04] studied how the number of preimages to g(a) aﬀects
the complexity of the collision search with the notion of balance of a function. In [FO90], Flajolet
and Odlyzko studied several characteristics of random mappings, in particular the distribution
of preimage sizes, the cycle size and the size of the iterated image. Their result was applied by
Hong and Kim [HK05] to the mickey [BD08] cipher. Indeed, they found experimentally that
the size of the iterated images of this function was essentially the size of the space divided by
the number of iterations, a behavior which they showed experimentally to correspond to the
prediction of Flajolet et al.. However, the resulting attacks were found to be less eﬃcient than
the simple collision search [R08], though they allow a time/memory trade-oﬀ.
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Overview of our results. We introduce the Collision Probability Spectrum parameter which quan-
tiﬁes how many solutions Equation (1) has on average and investigate its consequences over the
iterated images and preimages of S by g. We assume that the composition of two such functions
has certain properties, which is formalized as an independence assumption. For a large class of
mappings two important facts are proved in Theorem 2 (a reader may refer to Figure 1):
 First, the size of the iterated image of g is inversely proportional with the number i of
iterations:
|gi(S)| ∼ |S|κ
2 · i
,
where κ depends on the cps and where i has to be smaller than
√|S|  otherwise, the
result does not hold because of the cycles in the functionnal graph.
 Second, an element y ∈ gi(S) is the root of a collision tree consisting in elements xl such
that any of g(xl), g
2(xl), . . . , g
i(xl) is equal to y. The average size of this tree is νi:
νi ∼ κ
4
· i2,
with the same restriction on i: i <
√|S|.
Then we discuss the security of the t-sponge construction provided the cps of the update
function. We amend the collision search bound in the ﬂat sponge claim [BDPVA07]:
P =
Q2
2c+1
·
(
1 +
κ− 1
2r
)
,
where c is the capacity and r is the rate of the sponge.
Next, in Theorem 6 , we show for small r an improved preimage attack with complexity
2c · 2r+2/(κz),
where z is the number of zero bytes in the end of the hashed message (actually, any constant
suﬃces).
Finally, we construct an attack on gluon-64. Aided with a SAT-solver, we ﬁnd collisions for
the update function and demonstrate a preimage attack of complexity 2105 for a message ending
with 1 GByte of zeros, which violate the claimed preimage resistance level of 128 bits.
Structure. This paper is organized as follows. We introduce our theoretical framework in Sec-
tion 2 and discuss its application to existing primitives. We investigate the security of t-sponge
against collision and preimage search in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, we obtain inner-collisions
of the update function of gluon-64 with the help of a SAT-solver and show a preimage attack.
For the sake of concision, the proofs are moved to Appendix A.
Notations We denote by |E| and #E the size of a set E, by P[ω] the probability of an event ω
and by a
$← E the fact that a is drawn uniformly at random from a set E.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we introduce a model of random functions and highlight its diﬀerence with the
usual approach. We then give several properties of the (iterated) images and preimages of an
element by such functions.
S
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Fig. 1. Collision trees and output shrinkage of iterative non-injective functions. The dots represent elements of
S and there is an edge from x to y if g(x) = y. Here, g(a+ x) = g(a) always has exactly 3 solutions.
2.1 Collision Probability Spectrum and Function Model
Deﬁnition 1 (Collision Probability Spectrum). Let S be a ﬁnite space and let g : S → S
be a function. We denote ck the probability that the following equation has exactly k solutions
for a ∈ S picked uniformly at random in S:
g(a+ x) = g(a), (2)
so that
ck = P[#{x ∈ S, g(a+ x) = g(a)} = k | a $← S] (3)
The solutions x of this equation are called vanishing diﬀerences. The set of all the elements a of
S such that Equation (2) has exactly k solutions is denoted Vk. Finally, the set C = {ck}k≥1 is
the Collision Probability Spectrum (cps) of g.
An equivalent deﬁnition of the cps is that it is the probability distribution of the number of
solutions of Eq. 2. We now make some remarks regarding these deﬁnitions:
 Since 0 is always a solution of Equation (2), we have that c0 = 0.
 If g is a permutation, then C(g) = {c1 = 1, ck = 0 for k > 1}.
 The input space can be partitioned in the following way: S = ⋃∞k=1 Vk. Furthermore, the
output space can be partitioned as g(S) = ⋃∞k=1 g(Vk). This is also a disjoint union. Indeed,
y ∈ g(Vk) has exactly k preimages, by deﬁnition.
 The size of g(Vk) is |g(Vk)| = |S| · ck/k because to each element in g(Vk) correspond k
elements in Vk (see Figure 2). As a consequence,
|g(S)| = |S| ·
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
V1 V2
g(V1) g(V2)
S
g(S) S\g(S)
Fig. 2. The eﬀect of g with cps {c1 = c2 = 1/2} on S.
2.2 Composition of functions with known cps
The most interesting application of our theory is the properties of iterative constructions where
the iterated function has some known cps. However, to make meaningful and correct statements
about composition of such functions, some independency must be assumed.
Assumption 1 (Independence Assumption). Let g be a function with cps C. Then there
is no correlation between the events x ∈ Vj and g(x) ∈ Vk for any j, k.
This assumption, as we will see, holds for a few (but not for all) real primitives. For the rest
of the paper, we implicitly assume that it holds unless stated otherwise.
Deﬁnition 2. Suppose g is a function on S. Then `i deﬁned as
`i =
|S|
|gi(S)|
is called the shrinking ratio of g.
Our ﬁrst theorem allows to compute the shrinking ratio of the composition of two functions
with given cps.
Theorem 1. Let g and g′ be functions with cps C = {ck}k≥1 and C′ = {c′k}k≥1, respectively.
Then the shrinking ratio of the composition g ◦ g′ is computed as follows:
`1(g ◦ g′) =
( 1
`1
−
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− 1
`′1
)k)−1
.
In particular, when g′ = gi:
`i+1 =
( 1
`1
−
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− 1
`i
)k)−1
.
A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.1 but we provide a high level view of its structure.
Proof Sketch 1. We consider an element x0 ∈ g′(S) such that there exists {x0, ..., xk} with
g(xl) = g(x0), i.e. x0 ∈ Vk+1. The number of solutions of g(x0 + x) = g(x0) in g′(S) for x0
drawn at random in g′(S) ∩ Vk+1 follows a binomial distribution (m, k, 1/`′1) as xl ∈ g′(S) with
probability |g′(S)|/|S| = 1/`′1.
Using this observation, we can compute the probability that g(x0+x) = g(x0) hasm solutions
in g′(S) for all m: if it has m+ 1 solutions, then it must be that x0 ∈ Vk+1 and that only m of
the k non zero solutions made it to g′(S). Then, we deduce the size of the image of g′(S) by
g, i.e. we give an expression of `1(g ◦ g′).
Using this theorem, we can give the asymptotic behavior of `i and of the size of the collision
trees as i increases while remaining small enough so that g(x) is not on a cycle. The results
stated below have been checked experimentally on the functions for which the independence
assumption presumably holds. We need two more deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3. Suppose g is a function on S with cps C. Then
 κ(C) is the collision average of g  the average number of non-zero solutions of Equation (2):
κ =
∑
k≥1 ck · k − 1.
 νi(g) is the average tree size of g  the average number of elements in a collision tree rooted
in gi(S). Formally, it is the average number of pairs (xl, kl) ∈ S × [1, i] such that gkl(xl) = y
for y ∈ gi(S).
Theorem 2. Let g be a function with cps C, then for i <
√|S| the shrinking ratio and the
average tree size are approximated as follows for large enough i:
`i ∼ κ
2
· i, νi ∼ κ
4
· i2.
Proof Sketch 2. The asymptotic behaviour of `i can be deduced by using Theorem 1 with g
′ = gi
and then using the ﬁnite expansion of (1− 1/`i)k to see that `i+1 = `i + κ/2. For νi, we simply
note that νi =
∑i
k=1 `k. More details are given in Appendix A.2
Finally, we deﬁne the following quantities in the same way as Flajolet et al.[FO90].
Deﬁnition 4. We call cycle length and tail length, denoted respectively µ and λ, the average
smallest values such that
gλ(x) = gλ+µ(x)
for x drawn uniformly at random in S.
Experiments (see Appendix A.3) lead us to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Let g be a function of S with cps C. Experimentally, we found the following values
for the tail length λ and the cycle length µ:
λ ∼
√
pi
8 · κ |S|, µ ∼
√
pi
8 · κ |S|.
2.3 Independence assumption in practice
In this Section, we investigate some results from the literature about particular functions and
see how relevant our model is. A summary of this Section is given in Tab. 1.
Table 1. Characteristics derived from the cps of some functions.
Function κ `1 `i/i νi/i
2 Reference for the cps
mickey's update function 0.625 1.407 2−1.7 2−2.7 [TBA+13]
Random mapping 1 1.582 2−1 2−2 [FO90]
gluon-64's update function 6.982 3.578 21.8 20.8 Section 4.2
Random mappings The authors of [FO90] study random mappings and give the probability
that some x ∈ S has r preimages by a random mapping g. From this we deduce that the cps of
a random function is given by the Poisson distribution with λ = 1:
C = {e−1/(k − 1)!}k≥1.
Our framework implies
κ = 1 and `1 = 1/(1− e−1) and `i+1 = 1/
(
1− exp(−1/`i)
)
which ﬁts the results of [FO90](see also Appendix A.1). The authors of [HK05] observed that
log2(`i) ≈ log2(i)− 1,
which also corresponds to κ = 1 . Finally, the trail and cycle length given in Conj. 1 match those
predicted by [FO90] if we replace κ by 1.
A5/1 The update function of A5/1 does not satisfy the independence assumption. The author
of [Gol97] computed its cps and established that
`1 = 1.6, κ = 1.25,
If the assumption held, then the probability for an element in S to be in g100(S) would be about
2−6, which is very diﬀerent from the 2−2.5 actually observed by Biryukov et al. [BSW01]. The
reason is that the update function A5/1 may keep one of its three LFSR's untouched, which
means that x ∈ Vj and g(x) ∈ Vk are not independent events in its case.
mickey The update function of the mickey [BD08] stream-ciphers (v1 and v2) ﬁts our model.
Hong and Kim [HK05] performed some experiments on the ﬁrst version of mickey and, in
particular, estimated the size of g2
k
(S) for several values of k. Their results are coherent with our
model. For instance, they observed that log2(`i) (which they denote by EL(f
i)) is approximated
as
log2(`i) ≈ log2(i)− 1.8
The constant term 1.8 implies
κ/2 ≈ 2−1.8.
In turn, from the cps values computed in [TBA+13] (actually, the values ck/k) we obtain the
theoretical value
κ = 0.625,
which corresponds to a diﬀerence of about 7% with the experiments in [HK05].
3 Improved Collision and Preimage Search
In this section we explore generic collision and preimage search methods in their application to
functions with ﬁxed collision spectrum.
3.1 Basic Collision Search
First, we reformulate the result from Bellare and Kohno [BK04] with our notation.
Theorem 3 ([BK04]). Let g be a function with CPS C, and let κ be its collision average. Then
the birthday collision attack on g requires about
Q =
√
|S|
κ+ 1
. (4)
queries to g.
The original paper [BK04] used the parameter balance of g, denoted µ(g), which is computed
as
µ(g) = log|g(S)|
( |S|2∑
y∈S |g−1(y)|2
)
(5)
If we know the cps of g, the balance can be expressed as follows:
µ(g) ≈ 1− log2
(∑∞
k=1 k · ck
)
+ log2
(∑∞
k=1 ck/k
)
log2
(|S|) . (6)
If Conjecture 1 holds, then the memory-less collision search based on Floyd's cycle ﬁnding
algorithm should be
√
κ as fast as in the case of a random function.
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Fig. 3. Principle of a sponge construction. The message m is sliced into k blocks of r bits and "absorbed" during
the ﬁrst phase. Then, the j blocks of size r constituting the digest h are "squeezed".
3.2 Collision attacks on t-sponge
Now we demonstrate that the entropy loss because of collisions in the t-sponge construction,
though observable, can be mitigated by a large rate parameter.
Sponge construction The sponge construction [BDPVA07] is characterised by its rate r, its
capacity c and its update function g. It is based on an internal state of size r + c where, at
each round, r bits of the message are xor-ed. Then the sponge alternates the application of g
function with the message injection until the message has been entirely absorbed. The digest is
then squeezed by extracting r bits of the internal state and applying the update function to the
internal state again. This is repeated as many times as necessary to obtain a digest of desired
length. A representation of a sponge is given in Figure 3. The sponge-based hash function
is indiﬀerentiable from a random oracle in the random-function model up to 2c/2 queries to
g [BDPArg]. If g is not a permutation, the sponge is called transformative sponge or t-sponge.
We denote a sponge-based hash function by H : F∗2 → Frj2 , the internal state space by
S = Fr+c2 , and the update function by g : S → S.
Collision Search in t-sponge The following theorem shows that to get a signiﬁcant speed-up
in the collision search, the collision average κ should be at least of the same magnitude as 2r.
Theorem 4. Let g be a random mapping from Fr+c2 with cps C. Let H be a t-sponge of capacity
c and rate r updated with g. Then the probability of success of a brute-force collision attack on
H is
P =
Q2
2c+1
·
(
1 +
κ− 1
2r
)
where Q is the number of queries to g.
The proof of Theorem 4 is in Appendix A.4. For a completely random mapping we have
κ = 1, so that the theorem has the same form as in [BDPVA07].
Nevertheless, since in practice the functions are not drawn at random from the set of all
functions, it is of interest to be able to predict the eﬀect of their properties over the security
they provide. In particular, we see that a function with κ > 1 does not exactly provide c/2 bits of
security against birthday attacks. Such functions can be found in real cryptographic primitives,
see Section 4. However, we also immediately see that this eﬀect is small since typical value of κ
are of order of magnitude 1, 10 being already rather bad, while 2r is at least in the hundreds.
The designers of a t-sponge need not really worry about the number of collisions in the update
function if the rate is high enough.
3.3 Improved Preimage Attack
x0 ... xk
d
gi1 gik
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Fig. 4. The two targets of the iterated preimage attacks on d where d is in gzα(S) and z = 5. Diﬀerent colors
correspond to diﬀerent function calls.
Principle of the Iterated Preimage Attacks Consider a set {gk}k∈K of random functions of
S with cps's {Ck}k∈K and a ﬁxed starting point x0 ∈ S and let {k1, ..., kl} be a set of l elements
of K. We call keyed walk the sequence(
x1 = gk1(x0), x2 = gk2(x1), ..., xl = gkl(xl−1) = d
)
.
and it can for instance correspond to the successive values of the internal state of a t-sponge
or of a Davies-Meyer based Merkle-Damgård hash function as we discuss in the next sections.
Consider a keyed walk directed by a sequence {k1, k2, ..., α, α, ..., α} ending with z copies of the
same symbol α. Then, intuitively, much entropy will have been lost because of the z iterations
of gα so that it should be easier to ﬁnd a second sequence of keys leading to the same ﬁnal value.
This is formalized by the next theorem and a graphical representation of the phenomena we use
is given in Figure 4.
Theorem 5. Let {gk}k∈K be a set of random mappings of S with cps's {Ck}k∈K and consider
a sequence {k1, k2, ..., α, ..., α} of l keys from K ending with z identical keys α. Given the ﬁnal
value d of the corresponding keyed walk, the value of α and the number z, it is possible to ﬁnd,
for large enough z:
1. a keyed walk ending in d in time |S| · 4/(κz),
2. a keyed walk ending in d after precisely z calls to gα in time |S| · 2/κ.
where κ is the collision average of Cα.
Proof. Let d be the ﬁnal element in the walk. From the structure of the walk, we know that
d ∈ gzα(S). Using Theorem 2, we know that there are (κ/2) · z elements in g−zα (d) and that
the collision tree rooted at d contains (κ/4) · z2 elements. Therefore, such an element of g−zα (d)
is found with probability κ · z/(|S| · 2) and an element in the collision tree with probability
κ · z2/(|S| · 4).
However, in both cases, we need to call gα z times to know if the element we picked at random
is mapped to d after exactly z iterations of gα (ﬁrst case) or at most z iterations (second case).
Therefore, ﬁnding an element in the collision tree (ﬁrst case) requires |S|·z/(κ·z2/4) = |S|·4/(κz)
calls to gα and ﬁnding an element in g
−z
α (d) requires |S| · z/(κ · z/2) = |S| · 2/κ. uunionsq
Note that these attacks can be generalized to the case where the end of the message is
periodic instead of constant, i.e. if it ends with z copies of (α1, α2, ..., αp). We simply need to
replace gα by g
′ = gα1 ◦ ...◦gαp . The κ involved in the complexity computations is then that of g′,
i.e.
∑p
i=1 κi where κi is the collision average of gαi (see Lemma 2 in Section 5). The constraint on
z being large is only such that we can assume that z has the asymptotical behaviours described
in Theorem 2.
Application to a t-sponge Hashing a message with a t-sponge can be seen as performing
a keyed walk where the keys are the message blocks of length r and the initial value x0 is the
all-zero vector. The function gk is gk(x) = g(x ⊕ k) where k is set to zero after its r ﬁrst bits
and g is the update function of the t-sponge. Clearly, gk has the same cps as g.
While the ﬂat sponge claim provides a good description of the security oﬀered by a sponge (be
it a t-sponge or a p-sponge) against collision search and, for p-sponge, against second preimage
search, there is a gap between the number of queries it allows and the best algorithm known
for preimage search. In particular, there is to the best of our knowledge no algorithm allowing a
preimage search with complexity below 2c calls to the sponge function.1 Theorem 6 bridges the
gap between the 2c/2 bound of the ﬂat sponge claim and the 2c bound for preimage search by
applying Theorem 5 to the t-sponge structure.
Theorem 6. Let H be a t-sponge with update function g, and let κ be the collision average of
g. Let M be a message such that its last z injections to the sponge are identical. Then a preimage
to H(M) can be found with complexity
2c · 2r+2/(κz)
Such messages can be quite common. For instance, the last z calls of g can be blank calls for
the sole purpose to slow down the hashing as suggested by NIST [BDPVA13].2 Such an attack
can be prevented by setting an upper-bound of about 2r+2/κ for the length of the message which
in turn means that r has to be high in a t-sponge.
Similarity to the Herding Attack This attack was introduced in [KK06] and is also refered
to as the Nostradamus attack. In a herding attack, an attacker commits to a digest d and, when
given a challenge P , has to ﬁnd a suﬃx S such that H(P ||S) = d. To achieve this she builds,
during an oine phase, a so-called diamond structure which is essentially a binary collision tree
with 2` nodes and rooted at d. The nodes of the tree contain the value of the internal state as
well as the message block which needs to be absorbed to go to its child. During the online phase,
she uses the diamond to ﬁnd eﬃciently the suﬃx S: all she has to do is ﬁnd a way to reach any
of the 2`+1 − 1 nodes in the diamond from the given starting point.
Application to a Merkle-Damgård Construction When a block cipher is used in Davies-
Meyer mode to build a Merkle-Damgård-based hash function, the successive chaining values
hi ∈ S are obtained from the previous one and the i-th message block: hi = Emi(hi−1)⊕hi−1 =
gmi(hi−1). Because of the feedback of hi−1, we do not expect gk to be a permutation and,
therefore, expect such a construction to be vulnerable to iterated preimage attacks. The padding
used for Merkle-Damgård constructions usually takes into account the length of the message so
that we need a message of the same length. Therefore, it is not enough to aim at an element
in the collision tree, we need to ﬁnd an element which is precisely in g−zα (d) so that a preimage
search requires 2N+1/κ: if the cps of gk is such that κ > 2 then the iterated preimage attack
1 This case corresponds to the case where the attacker inverts the squeezing operations in time 2c to retrieve
the last internal state of the sponge before the squeezing and then uses a meet-in-the middle approach to ﬁnd
a valid message leading to this internal state in time 2c/2 (see [GPP11]). Furthermore, this second step cannot
be carried out in the case of a t-sponge since the update function cannot be inverted.
2 Here, we consider that the message hashed is of a length equal to a multiple of r to begin with, so that the
padding consisting in appending a one to the end of the message can be seen as part of the squeezing.
is more eﬃcient than brute-force. Furthermore, if there is an eﬃcient way around the padding
(e.g., with expandable messages [KS05]), the eﬃciency becomes 2N+2/(κz) where N is the size
of the internal state of the hash function.
4 Preimage Attack on gluon-64
4.1 The gluon family of hash functions
Introduced in [BDM+12], the gluon family of hash functions consists of three members cor-
responding to diﬀerent security levels: gluon-64, gluon-80 and gluon-112. They have a t-
sponge structure and have characteristics summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Characteristics of the hash functions of the gluon family.
name rate r capacity c collision search preimage search
gluon-64 8 128 264 2128
gluon-80 16 160 280 2160
gluon-112 32 224 2112 2224
The function g used to update the internal state has the same structure in the three cases.
It can be seen as a stream-cipher based on a Feedback with Carry Shift Register (fcsr). The
concept of fcsr has evolved through time as the ﬁrst stream-cipher [AB05] based on a component
bearing this name got broken [HJ11]. When we talk about fcsr in this paper, we refer to the
last version of this structure, i.e. the one used in X-FCSR v2 [ABL+09] and, of course, gluon.
For example, the algebraic representation of the fcsr used by gluon-64 is given in Fig. 5.
A fcsr is made of w cells of r bits. Each cell may be on the receiving end of a feedback. If
the cell i receives no feed-backs, then its content at time t+ 1 is the content of the cell of index
i+1 at time t. Consider now that the cell i receives a feedback. This cell contains an additional
memory to store the value of the carry from one clock to the next. The content of the cell at
time t is denoted mti and that of the carry register c
t
i. Since it receives a feedback there are a
cell of index j and a value of shift s (possibly equal to zero) such that:
mt+1i = m
t
i+1 +
(
mtj  s
)
+ cti
ct+1i = m
t
i+1 ·
(
mtj  s
)
+ mti+1 · cti +
(
mtj  s
) · cti
where  s is a C-style notation for the shift of the content of a cell by s bits to the left (or |s|
bits to the right if s ≤ 0) and + and · are respectively the bitwise addition and multiplication
in Fr2.
The update function of every member of the gluon family is made of three steps: padding
of the input and loading in a fcsr (pad), clocking of the fcsr (ρ) and ﬁltering Φ. We describe
these steps separately.
pad The internal state of the sponge is of size r(w− 1), so that r(w− 1) = r+ c. The padding
consists simply in appending a block of r bits all equal to one to the end of the internal
state. The rw bits thus obtained are then loaded in a fcsr with an internal state made
of w cells of size r. All the carries of the fcsr are set to zero. This operation is denoted
pad : Fr+c2 → Frw2 × Frw2 as the output is made of the main register and the carry register of
the fcsr.
ρd+4 The fcsr is clocked d+ 4 times. One clocking is denoted ρ : Frw2 × Frw2 → Frw2 × Frw2 .
Φ The output of g is extracted r bits by r bits using the following method: ﬁxed words of the
main register are rotated and then xor-ed to obtain r bits and then the fcsr is clocked. This
operation is repeated w−1 times so as to have r(w−1) = r+ c bits of output. The action of
clocking the fcsr w−1 times while ﬁltering r bits each time is denoted Φ : Frw2 ×Frw2 → Fr+c2 .
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Fig. 5. Algebraic representation of the fcsr used in gluon-64. Blue arrows correspond to feed-backs shifted to
the right and red ones to the left. The value of the shift is given by the label of the arrow.
Overall, g is equal to Φ ◦ ρd+4 ◦ pad. The function pad is a bijection and we shall consider
that the restriction of Φ over the set of the pairs main register/carry register reachable after
d+ 4 calls to ρ starting in the image of pad is collision-free. The designers of gluon claim:
After a few iterations from an initial state, the automaton is in a periodic sequence of
states of length P . The average number of required iterations to be in such a state is
experimentally less than log2(n), where n is the size of the main register [...] This leads
to consider a function [g] which is really close to a permutation from {0, 1}b into itself
because the surjective part of the construction is really limited once the function [g] acts
on the main cycle.
However, what happens during these ﬁrst rounds, before the main cycle is reached? It is
possible to encode the equation
(ρk ◦ pad)(a+ x) = (ρk ◦ pad)(x) (7)
for a ﬁxed a into a CNF-formula solvable by a SAT-solver as long as k is not too big, say 10. The
encoding is fairly straight-forward and we shall not go into the details for the sake of concision.
Note that solving the equation (ρk ◦ pad)(x) = y using a SAT-solver is fast, meaning that it
is possible to run a fcsr backward. However, we tried encoding the ﬁltering so as to solve
(Φ ◦ ρk ◦ pad)(x) = y but no SAT-solver was able to handle the corresponding CNF-formula
 we killed the process after 1 week of running time for gluon-112 (simplest ﬁltering of the
three), and for k = 1 instead of k = d+ 4 = 46.
We solved (7) for many values of a and for k = 10 for each member of the gluon family.
While no non-zero solutions were found for any a for gluon-80 and gluon-112, it turns out
that (7) has many solutions for gluon-64. We used Algorithm 1 to ﬁnd to which Vk any element
a ∈ S belongs by enumerating all the values of x such that (7) holds. It works by solving (7) for
x, thus (possibly) ﬁnding a solution x1; then solving (7) with the constraint that the solution
must be diﬀerent from x1, thus (possibly) ﬁnding x2, etc. until no more solutions can be found.
If there are k such x 6= 0, then a is in Vk+1.
4.2 cps and Preimage Attack on gluon-64
We ran Algorithm 1 for gluon-64 on 24,000 diﬀerent elements chosen uniformly at random
in S = Fr+c2 . This allowed us to approximate the cps of the update function. Our results are
Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Approximation of the cps of the function used by gluon-64 to update its internal state over 24,000
random elements of F1362 . Note that non-zero ck were observed well after k = 20.
We deduce that c1 = 0.065, `1 = 3.578 and κ = 6.982 which are much worse than what one
should expect from a random function, namely c1 = e
−1 ≈ 0.368, `1 = 1/(1 − e−1) ≈ 1.582
and κ = 1. This means that ﬁnding a preimage in a scheme equivalent to appending z identical
words at the end of the message has a complexity of 2136+2/(6.982 · z) = 2128 · (146.7/z). For
z > 147, this is more eﬃcient than classical brute-force. The complexities for some values of
z < 2(r+c)/2 = 268 are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Complexity C of a preimage search for d = H(m) where H is gluon-64 and m is unkown except for
the z identical bytes in its end.
z log2(C)
147 b 127.99
500 b 126.23
1 kb 125.23
1 Mb 115.27
1 Gb 105.30
109 Gb 75.19
5 Other properties of cps
The cps of a function is preserved by some transformation as shown in Lemma 1. The collision
average of g1 ◦ g2 has a simple expression given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Let g be a function with cps C, P : S → S be a permutation and J : S → S be
injective over g(S). Then g′ = J ◦ g ◦ P has cps C as well.
Proof. Since J is injective over g(S), we have g′(y) = g′(a) if and only if g(P (y)) = g(P (a)).
Since the events g′(y) = g′(a) has k solutions and g(x) = g(P (a)) has k solutions have the
same probability, namely ck, we see that g and g
′ have the same cps. uunionsq
Fig. 7. Evolution of the number of possible values for the internal state of gluon-64 when a message block is
absorbed (thick vertical arrow) or when it absorbs a constant several times (thin vertical arrow) z = 3 times.
Lemma 2. Let g1 have collision average κ1 and g2 have collision average κ2. Then g1 ◦ g2 has
collision average κ1 + κ2.
Proof. Suppose that (g2 ◦ g1)(x) = (g2 ◦ g1)(y) with x 6= y. There are two distinct ways this
could happen:
 if g1(x) = g1(y), which happens in κ1 cases on average,
 or if g1(x) 6= g1(y) but g2
(
g1(x)
)
= g2
(
g1(y)
)
. There are on average κ2/`1 solutions for
g2(X) = g2(Y ) in g1(S) where `1 is the shrinking ratio of g1. However, each of these solutions
is the image of `1 elements of S by g1.
Overall, the equation has κ1 + `1 · κ2/`1 = κ1 + κ2 solutions, which proves the lemma. uunionsq
Note that Lemma 2 had to hold at least for g1 = g2 because otherwise we would have had a
contradiction with the asymptotic behaviour of `i described in Theorem 2.
6 Conclusion
We introduced the notion of cps and of the collision average κ, which is computed from the
cps. The collision average value determines the shrinking ratio and the collision tree size of
an iterative construction, and hence directly aﬀects their security, in particular preimage and
collision resistance.
We have showed that the t-sponge is a fragile object when the rate parameter is small.
For instance, preimages to long messages of speciﬁc structure become much easier to ﬁnd. We
gave speciﬁc recommendations for the designers of such constructions. Hopefully, our framework
might become a useful tool in the design.
Finally, we demonstrated a practical application of our methodology. Aided with a SAT-
solver, we found collisions for the gluon-64 update function and then approximated its cps
and the collision average κ. We showed that for not so long messages of 1 Gigabyte a preimage
can be found with complexity 2105 compared to the security claim of 2128, and shortcut attacks
are possible for messages of only a kilobyte long.
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A Proofs and Experiments
A.1 Proof of the Iterated Values of `i
Let us prove Theorem 1.
Proof. We shall look at the eﬀect multiple iterations of g have over sets {x0, ..., xk} where
g(xj) = g(xj′) for all j, j
′.
Let x0 be in g
′(S) and such that there are k other elements {x1, ..., xk} such that g(x0) =
g(xj), i.e. x ∈ Vk+1.
As every element in S is in g′(S) with probability only 1/`′1, the number of elements colliding
with x in g′(S) follows a binomial distribution with parameters (m, k, 1/`′1) (we consider that the
output of g′ are uniformly distributed over S and that they are independent from one another).
Thus, there are m elements colliding with x ∈ g′(S) with probability ( km)(1/`′1)m(1− 1/`′1)k−m.
Let Cm+1 be the probability that g(x0 + x) = g(x0) has m non-zero solutions in g
′(S) knowing
that x0 ∈ g′(S):
Cm+1 =
∞∑
k=m
ck+1
(
k
m
)( 1
`′1
)m(
1− 1
`′1
)k−m
. (8)
Furthermore, we have:
`′1
`1(g ◦ g′) =
|(g ◦ g′)(S)|
|g′(S)| =
∞∑
m=1
Cm
m
,
and so:
`′1
`1(g ◦ g′) =
∞∑
m=1
1
m
∞∑
k=m−1
ck+1
(
k
m− 1
)( 1
`′1
)m−1(
1− 1
`′1
)k−m+1
=
∞∑
k=0
k∑
m=0
ck+1
m+ 1
(
k
m
)( 1
`′1
)m(
1− 1
`′1
)k−m
.
This expression can be simpliﬁed because
(
k
m
)
/(m+ 1) =
(
k+1
m+1
)
/(k + 1), so that:
`′1
`1(g ◦ g′) =
∞∑
k=0
ck+1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
(
k + 1
m+ 1
)( 1
`′1
)m(
1− 1
`′1
)k−m
=
∞∑
k=0
ck+1
k + 1
k+1∑
m=1
(
k + 1
m
)( 1
`′1
)m−1(
1− 1
`′1
)k−(m−1)
=
∞∑
k=0
ck+1 · `′1
k + 1
( k+1∑
m=0
(
k + 1
m
)( 1
`′1
)m(
1− 1
`′1
)k+1−m − (1− 1
`′1
)k+1)
.
Note that
∑k+1
m=0
(
k+1
m
)(
1
`′1
)m(
1− 1
`′1
)k+1−m
= 1 (binomial theorem), so in the end we obtain:
1
`1(g ◦ g′) =
∞∑
k=0
ck+1
k + 1
(
1− (1− 1
`′1
)k+1)
=
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− (1− 1
`′1
)k)
=
1
`1
−
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− 1
`′1
)k
which proves the Theorem. uunionsq
Note that this result is coherent with the one found by [FO90] in the case of random functions,
i.e. when {ck}k≥1 = {e−1/
(
(k − 1)!)}k≥1. Indeed, they prove that
1
`i+1
= 1− exp (−1
`i
)
,
which is the same as the one we found:
1
`i+1
=
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− (1− 1
`i
)k)
= e−1
∞∑
k=1
1
k!
(
1− (1− 1
`i
)k)
= 1− exp (−1
`i
)
.
A.2 Proof of the Asymptotic Behaviors
Theorem 1 gives the recurrence relation `i satisﬁes so we can prove its asymptotic behavior.
Proof. Since `i is obviously increasing (the output space keeps shrinking and we keep i < 2
n/2
to remain away from the main cycle) we have, for large enough i:
1
`i+1
=
∞∑
k=1
ck
k
(
1− (1− k
`i
+
k(k − 1)
2 · `2i
+ o(`−2i )
))
=
1
`i
∞∑
k=1
ck
(
1− k − 1
2 · `i + o(`
−1
i )
)
,
so that we have:
`i
`i+1
=
∞∑
k=1
ck −
∞∑
k=1
ck · (k − 1)
2 · `i + o(`
−1
i )
= 1− κ/2
`i
+ o(`−1i )
which in turns implies
`i+1 =
`i
1− κ/2`i + o(`
−1
i )
= `i +
κ
2
+ o(1),
so that `i =
κ
2 · i+ o(i). This observation concludes the proof of the behavior of `i.
Let us now look at νi. There are on average `w elements reaching y ∈ gw(S) in exactly w
iterations. Since gi(S) ⊆ gw(S) for all w ≤ i, we have that y ∈ gi(S) is reached, on average, by:
 `1 elements in exactly 1 iteration,
 `2 elements in exactly 2 iterations,
...
 `i elements in exactly i iterations.
Overall, there are on average
∑i
w=1 `w ≈
∑i
w=1(κ/2)w ≈ (κ/4)i2 elements reaching y ∈ gi(S)
after at most i iterations of g. uunionsq
A.3 Experimental Justiﬁcation of Conjecture 1
For every N between 12 and 17 included, we generated 100 functions with a given cps and, for
each of them, we picked 40 elements at random in FN2 and computed λ/2N/2 and µ/2N/2 for each
of them (24,000 data points for each cps). The average of these values for cps's corresponding
to diﬀerent values of κ are given in Fig. 8. As we can see, both λ/2N/2 and µ/2N/2 are almost
equal to
√
pi/(8κ), which is equivalent to Conj. 1 being correct.
A.4 Proof of the Eﬀect of the cps on a t-sponge
Proof. Our proof is a modiﬁed version of the one used by Bertoni et al. in the paper where they
introduced the sponge construction [BDPVA07]. In particular, we use the same terminology: we
call the elements of Fc+r2 nodes and we partition the space according to the value of the bits
in the capacity to obtain 2c super-nodes, each containing 2r nodes. There is an oriented edge
from node x to node y if and only if y = g(x). Finding a collision in H boils down to ﬁnding
two diﬀerent paths in this graph starting from points in the super-node with capacity zero to
an identical super-node.
Fig. 8. Average value of λ/2N/2 and µ/2N/2 for diﬀerent κ.
We shall study the fan-in and the fan-out of these super-nodes, the fan-in of a super-node
being the number of edges going to it and the fan-out the number of edges going out of it. In this
framework, the fan-out of each super-node is 2r. However, the number of edges going in each
super-node is not constant. Consider some super-node Y made of nodes y1, ..., y2r . Each yi has
a fan-in F (yi) so that the F (yi)'s are independent and identically distributed random variables
with the distribution
P[F (yi) = k] =
ck
k
if k ≥ 1 , P[F (yi) = 0] = 1− 1
`1
which has a mean equal to 1 and a variance equal to κ.
The value of the fan-in of the super-node Y is the sum of the fan-in's of its nodes:
F (Y ) =
2r∑
i=1
F (yi).
We consider that 2r is large enough to apply the central limit theorem so that F (Y ) is normally
distributed with mean equal to 2r and variance equal to κ · 2r.
Consider now the set Nk of all the super-nodes with fan-in equal to k; in other words the set
of the super-nodes with exactly k preimages. It has a size equal to |Nk| = 2cG(k) where
G(k) =
1√
2pi · κ · 2r · exp
(− 1
2
· (k − 2
r)2
κ · 2r
)
and the Nk's form a partition of the space of the super-nodes. Consider some node x1: the
probability that its image by g is in a super-node of Nk is
P[g(x1) ∈ Nk] = k
2c+r
· |Nk| = k
2r
·G(k)
Let V be the super-node g(x1) is in. The probability that a second element x2 6= x1 is such that
g(x2) is in the same super-node as g(x1) is the probability that x2 is at the beginning of one of
the k− 1 edges going to V which are not the one starting at x1. Therefore, the probability that
g(x1) and g(x2) are in the same super-node V knowing that V ∈ Nk is
P[g(x1), g(x2) ∈ V | V ∈ Nk] = k − 1
2c+r
· k
2r
·G(k)
so that the probability that g(x1) and g(x2) have the same capacity bits for x1 and x2 chosen
uniformly at random is
P[g(x1), g(x2) ∈ V ] =
∞∑
k=0
k(k − 1)
2c+2r
·G(k) ≈ (2
r)2 + κ · 2r − 2r
2c+2r
.
Therefore, the probability of success of a collision search performed by absorbing Q messages at
random until two internal states with the same capacity bits are observed is
P[success of collision search] ≈
(
Q
2
)
22r + 2r(κ− 1)
2c+2r
≈ Q
2
2c+1
· (1 + κ− 1
2r
)
.
uunionsq
B Algorithms
Algorithm 1 Enumerating all the solutions of g(a+ δ) = g(a).
D = empty list
b = 0
while b < rw − 1 do
F = CNF(ρ1k) + CNF(ρ
2
k) + CNF(ρ
1
k(x) = ρ
2
k(y))
F = F + CNF(x = a) + CNF(xb + yb = 1)
for δ in D do
F = F + CNF(x+ y 6= δ)
end for
if SAT-solver concludes that F is satisﬁable then
Retrieve y from the assignment and append x+ y to D
else
b = b+ 1 . We move on only when this bit is exhaustively used
end if
end while
Return D
